M any environmentalists fear that the use of discounting in formulating economic policies that will affect the control and use of the earth's natural resources may be against the interests of the natural environment. They contend that the higher the discount rate, the less long-run
environmental damage will appear to matter, and the less attractive will investments designed to conserve the environment for future generations appear to be. Furthermore, the resulting accelerated depletion of natural resources will leave those generations with an inadequate natural capital stock to serve their needs.
This article examines these concerns and evaluates them systematically. We consider environmental questions in the context of choice through time and discuss whether, and in what way, the future should be discounted in policy areas with a significant environmental dimension. The article begins by describing the rationale for discounting and the main factors that determine the discount rate. There is considerable debate within the economics profession as to how relevant or significant each of these factors should be in calculating the rate. Each, moreover, has an environmental dimension. The article goes on to describe and evaluate that dimension. Thus the connection between the basis of discounting and environmental concerns is explored.
The connection also works in the other direction-from specific environmental issues to the role of discounting within them. The third part of the article deals with this link by examining two important areas where choice of discounting is crucial: projects that will bring irreversible damage to the environment, and policies concerning the management of natural resources in general.
Our review of the debate over discounting and the environment leads us to conclude that, although the desire to "do something" to the discount rate for environmental reasons at first sight seems eminently reasonable, it is nearly always unworkable in practice-and often would not be the best solution in any case. Instead, the problem might better be tackled by developing the concept of sustainability as a specific policy instrument. The last part of the article describes how that might be done.
The Rationale for Discounting
The process of discounting can be understood by looking at the familiar mechanism of compound interest. If $1 is invested at 5 percent annually compounded, it will be worth $1.63 in ten years time. By the same token, 61 cents invested now, at the same rate of interest, will be worth $1 in ten years time. We would then refer to 0.61 as the present value factor for a ten-year period when the discount rate is S percent. Given this direct relation between discounting and compound interest, it is evident that the higher the discount rate, the lower the discount factor, and the faster the fall of the discount factor, as the time horizon is extended.
The practice of discounting in assessing projects or policies arises because individuals attach less weight to a benefit or cost in the future than they do to a benefit or cost now. Impatience, or "time preference," is one reason; another is that, since capital is productive, a dollar's worth of resources now will generate more than a dollar's worth of goods and services in the future. Hence an entrepreneur would be willing to pay more than one dollar in the future to acquire a dollar's worth of these resources now. This argument for discounting concerns the "marginal productivity of capital," the use of the word "marginal" indicating that it is the productivity of additional units of capital that is relevant.
The Choice of the Discount Rate A key instrument of economic policy, the discount rate appears in various guises. As the ruling interest rate underlying the economy, it is a crucial element in the mix of macroeconomic policy measures, such as monetary and public expenditure policy, designed to control inflation and influence savings rates. Private sector discount rates help to determine the amount of private investment. In the extractive sectors, discount rates influence the rate at which natural resources such as oil are depleted. So the choice of discount rate matters very much, and debate about how to choose it has been long and wide ranging. (For industrial countries, see Sen 1967; Marglin 1967; Baumol 1968; Feldstein 1972; and Bradford 1975 . For developing countries, see Marglin, Sen, and Dasgupta 1972; Little and Mirrlees 1974; Squire and van der Tak 1975; and Ray 1984.) Excluding questions of risk, which are discussed later, the two main contenders for the criterion by which to choose the social discount rate are the social rate of time preference, based on the rate of time preference, and the opportunity cost of capital, based on the marginal productivity of capital. The two rates would be equal if there were efficient markets and no taxes, but in practice time preference rates tend to be below the opportunity cost of capital. The early debate on which rate to use focused on the sources of the funds applied to the project and on the eventual uses of the benefits of the project (Marglin 1967; Feldstein 1972 ; for a discussion see Nash 1981 and Lind 1982) . In particular, the extent to which the costs and benefits detracted from, and added to, consumption relative to savings was seen to be crucial in setting the discount rate. In the context of developing countries, additional difficulties arose because not only benefits and costs, but also income to the government relative to consumption and investment by the private sector, were valued differently for different points in time.' These problems have, to some extent, been resolved by two conventions: first, by defining one social group whose benefits or costs are declared to be the "unit of account" and multiplying the benefits or costs of other groups by a conversion factor to obtain comparable figures, and second, by using a discount rate that is appropriate for the group whose costs and benefits have been declared the unit of account, or numeraire. Anil Markandya and David W. Pearce A commonly accepted convention, which has been adopted by the World Bank, is to declare uncommitted income in the hands of the government as the unit of account. Then it can be shown that the corresponding discount rate, referred to as the accounting rate of interest, can be approximated by a weighted average of the social rate of time preference and the opportunity cost of capital, the weights being the proportions of the yields from the public projects that are, on average, reinvested. (This is a tremendous simplification, derived by a succession of approximations explained in van der Tak 1975 and Ray 1984.) Although this method has been accepted and the accounting rate of interest has been calculated for many countries, there is still considerable disagreement as to its validity in practice. This can be seen from the fact that, whereas accounting rates of interest are frequently in the range of 4-7 percent, the actual rate used for determining projects funded by the Bank ranges upward from 10 percent. Squire, Little, and Durdag (1979) , for example, obtain an accounting rate of interest for Pakistan of about 2 percent; other, more recent studies have obtained slightly higher figures (about 5-6 percent), but they are still below the real rates of 10 percent and more that are currently used for project appraisal within the World Bank. The reasons for these differences are complex and not relevant to this discussion, but it is worth noting that even before environmental issues have been raised, disagreement exists on the choice of the discount rate. In looking at the relation between environmental considerations and discounting, we need, therefore, to consider the arguments for and against various different ways of calculating the rate.
Discounting and the Environment
In analyzing the relation between environmental concerns and the social discount rate, we first reexamine the rationale for discounting and the methods of calculating discount rates in the light of problems peculiar to the environment. Second, we identify and analyze the implications of specific environmental issues.
The Rationale for Discounting from an Environmental Perspective
The objections to discounting can be conveniently presented under five headings: pure time preference; social rate of time preference; opportunity cost of capital; risk and uncertainty; and the interests of future generations.
Much of the environmental literature argues against discounting in general and high discount rates in particular (Parfit 1983 , Goodin 1986 ). There is in fact no unique relation between high discount rates and environmental deterioration. High rates may well shift the cost burden to future generations, but as the discount rate rises so the level of investment overall falls, slowing the pace of economic development in general. Since natural resources are required for investment, the demand for such resources is lower at higher discount rates. High discount rates may also discourage development projects that compete with existing environmentally benign uses-for instance, watershed development as opposed to existing use of the wilderness. The higher the discount rate, the less attractive are projects such as dams, in which a large amount of capital has to be expended at the beginning, in return for water or power over a prolonged period. If the development is avoided, a large area may be saved from inundation, leaving it available-at least in principle-for use in its existing form. In some cases, part of that use is as a forest or as a nature preserve. Exactly how the choice of discount rate will influence the use of natural resources or affect the environment is thus ambiguous Pearce 1988, Krautkraemer 1988 )-an important point, because it rebuts the simplistic generalization that discount rates should be lowered to accommodate environmental considerations (a prescription already challenged at an intuitive level by Krutilla 1967) .
PURE INDIVIDUAL TIME PREFERENCE. In terms of personal preferences no one appears to deny the impatience principle and its implication of a positive discount rate for individuals. Arguments, do, however, exist against permitting pure time preference to influence social discount rates-that is, the rates used in connection with collective decisions. These arguments can be summarized as follows. First, acting on the impatience principle will not necessarily maximize welfare over the lifetime of an individual (Strotz 1956, Krutilla and Fisher 1975) . This is a refinement of the long-standing view that time discounting because of impatience is irrational in general (Jevons 1871, Bohm-Bawerk 1884, Ramsey 1929 , Pigou 1932 . Second, what individuals want carries no necessary implications for public policy. In many countries, for example, the state compels individuals to save-through state pensions, for instance-overriding private preferences about savings behavior. The third objection is that the underlying value judgment is improperly expressed. A society that puts a premium on the satisfaction of wants should recognize that what matters is the satisfaction of wants as they arise. But this means that it is tomorrow's satisfaction that matters, not today's assessment of tomorrow's satisfaction (Goodin 1986) .
The validity of these objections to using pure time preference is clearly debatable. Overturning the value judgment fundamental to the liberal economic tradition-that individual preferences should count for social decisions-requires compelling reasons. Strong arguments for pater-nalism do exist, but they are not, in our view, sufficient to justify its use in this context. The third argument, that the basic value judgment needs reexpressing, is philosophically persuasive, but in practical terms the immediacy of wants in many developing countries where environmental problems are serious argues for the retention of the usual formulation of this basic judgment.
SOCIAL RATE OF TIME PREFERENCE. The social time preference rate attempts to measure the rate at which social welfare or utility of consumption falls over time. This will depend on the rate of pure time preference, on how fast consumption grows, and, in turn, on how fast utility falls as consumption grows. The social rate of time preference, i, can be expressed (see Ray 1984) by i = ng + z, where z is the rate of pure time preference, g is the rate of growth of real consumption per capita, and n is the percentage fall in the additional utility derived from each percentage point increase in consumption (n is referred to as the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption). With no growth in per capita consumption, the social rate of time preference would be equal to the private rate, z. If consumption is expected to grow, the social rate rises above the private rate. The intuitive rationale here is that the more one expects to have in the future, the less one is willing to sacrifice today to obtain even more in the future. Moreover, this impact is greater, the faster marginal utility falls with consumption.
Environmentalists point to the presumed positive value of g in the formula for the social time preference rate. First, they argue that there are underlying limits to the growth process. We cannot expect positive growth rates of, say, 2-3 percent to last long, because of constraints on natural resources or limits on the capacity of natural environments to act as sinks for waste products. Global warming from the emission of greenhouse gases and the depletion of the ozone layer bear out the seriousness of this concern, but how relevant in practice the "limits" argument is for economic planning is more equivocalit may have more relevance for the way in which economies develop than as an argument for reconsidering the basic growth objective itself. A second concern highlights the problems of particular regions. In low-income Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, real per capita consumption fell 1.9 percent a year between 1973 and 1983. That is, g was negative. Does this mean that the social discount rate should be negative? Arguably, it should, although past negative growth may not be relevant to a discount rate based on expected future growth. More significantly, the pure time preference component of a social discount rate could be argued to be very high. Real borrowing rates in poor economies are often on the order of 10-15 percent and offer a first guess at personal time preference rates. These might then justify the typical rates of 10 percent and more used by lending agencies in the appraisal of projects.
Assuming that it is reasonable to use pure time preference rates at all, are these high rates acceptable? Many would contend that the mere presence of poverty predicates high discount rates, because the satisfaction of immediate needs for food is more urgent than the assurance of longer-term food security. But a special difficulty arises when high time preference rates are inferred from the observation of poverty in the context of environmental problems. High discount rates can "cause" environmental degradation when short-term measures to satisfy immediate wants foreclose more environmentally appropriate practices such as tree planting-but the environmental degradation leads in turn to the poverty that "causes" high discount rates. Thus to use these rates to evaluate environmentally oriented investments (for instance, soil conservation measures and afforestation) is untenable.
These considerations suggest that the use of a social rate of time preference based on the assumptions expressed in the equation is valid only when we can reliably expect sustainable changes in real consumption per capita. In situations in which the environment is being degraded and incomes are stagnant or falling, inferred values of z cannot be taken as relevant to the calculation of i. In these circumstances there are no clear rules for choosing a social rate of time preference, although one could argue strongly that the value of i should be adjusted downward.
OPPORTUNITY COST OF CAPITAL. The opportunity cost of capital is obtained by looking at the rate of return on the best investment of similar risk that is displaced as a result of undertaking the project in question. It is only reasonable to require an investment to yield a return at least as high as that on the alternative use of funds. This is the justification for a discount rate based on opportunity cost. In developing countries where there is a shortage of capital, such rates tend to be very high and their use is often justified on grounds of optimal allocation of scarce capital. (Markandya and Pearce 1988 give examples of how scarce capital can in fact be allocated without making adjustments to the discount rate. What is required is that a premium be attached to capital such that each dollar invested has a value greater than one dollar in the project calculations.)
The environmental literature has made some attempts to discredit opportunity cost discounting (Parfit 1983 , Goodin 1986 ). One criticism is that opportunity cost discounting implies a reinvestment of benefits at the opportunity cost rate, and this is often invalid. For example, at a 10 percent discount rate, $100 today is comparable to $121 in two years' time if the $100 is invested for one year to yield $10 of return and then both the original capital and the return are invested for another year to obtain a total of $121. Now, if the return is consumed but not reinvested, the critics argue, the consumption flows have no opportunity cost. What, they say, is the relevance of a discount rate based on assumed reinvested profits if in fact the profits are consumed? The idea that the mix of consumption and reinvestment benefits flowing from the investment should modify the underlying discount rate is familiar to economists. It provides one of the rationales for the weighted discount rate procedures advocated by Marglin (1967) and has been widely discussed in the literature.
Another environmentalist criticism of opportunity cost discounting relates to compensation across generations. Suppose an investment today would cause environmental damages valued at $x, T years from now. In discounted terms this damage would be represented by an amount much less than x. How much less would depend on how high the discount rate r was and on how large T was. The argument for using this smaller figure instead of x is the following.
If this latter amount were invested at the opportunity cost of capital discount rate r, it would amount to $x in T years' time. This could then be used to compensate those who suffer the damages in that year. Parfit (1983) argues, however, that using the discounted value is only legitimate if the compensation is actually paid. Otherwise, he argues, we cannot represent those damages by a discounted cost. 2 The problem here is that actual and potential compensation are being confused. The fact that there is a sum generated by the project that could be used to compensate the victim is enough to ensure its efficiency. Whether the compensation should actually be carried out is a separate question irrelevant to the issue of how to choose a discount rate.
These two arguments against opportunity cost discounting are not, in our view, persuasive, although the first can be argued to be relevant to a weighted approach.
RISK AND UNCERTAINTY. It is widely accepted that a benefit or cost should be valued less the more uncertain is its occurrence. The types of uncertainty generally regarded as relevant to discounting are the risk-of-death argument (uncertainty about whether an individual will be alive at some future date); uncertainty about what the individual's preferences will be in the future; and uncertainty about the size of the benefit or cost.
The risk-of-death argument is often used to justify the impatience principle itself, the argument being that a good reason for preferring consumption now rather than later is that one may not live to enjoy the fruits of one's restraint. The counter-argument is that whereas an individual is mortal, society is not, and so its decisions should not be guided by considerations of mortality. This is another variant on the view that, in calculating social time preference rates, the pure time preference element z may be too high.
Second, uncertainty about the future preferences of individuals is relevant to certain goods and perhaps even to certain aspects of environmental conservation. It is surely not relevant when the benefits of the projects or policies in question are food, shelter, water, and energy. If anything, future preference for these goods is more certain, not less (Barry 1977) . Moreover, in cases in which concern about uncertain future preferences is legitimate, economists generally allow for the uncertainty by including option value-that is, the value of reducing future uncertainty-in an estimate of the benefit or cost (Bishop 1982, Fisher and Haneman 1986) .
The third kind of uncertainty is relevant, but adjusting the discount rate to allow for it poses problems. Such adjustments assume that the scale of risks is increasing exponentially over time, and since there is no reason to believe that the risk factor takes this particular form it is inappropriate to correct for such risks by raising the discount rate. This argument is accepted by economists Pearce 1972, Stiglitz 1986 ) but the practice of using risk-adjusted discount rates remains common among policymakers. For example, there is a 2 percent premium attached to the officially recommended 5 percent "test discount rate" in the United Kingdom in the presence of "benefit optimism" (U.K. Treasury 1980) . This means that if the project has benefits that are considered to be uncertain, such as a new electric energy system involving development, a test discount rate of 7 percent instead of 5 percent is applied. Of course, the decision of what is uncertain is itself rather arbitrary in this context.
If uncertainty is not to be handled by adjustments in the discount rate, how should it be treated? The alternative is to make adjustments to the underlying cost and benefit streams. This essentially involves replacing each uncertain benefit or cost by its certainty equivalent-a procedure that seems to us to be correct, even though the calculations involved are complex and it is not yet clear how operational the method is. In any case, whatever the drawbacks to the alternative procedure, adding a risk premium to the discount rate is not the solution because, as has been shown by Brown (1983) and Prince (1985) , the use of such a premium implies the existence of arbitrary certainty equivalents for each of the costs and benefits.
THE INTERESTS OF FUTURE GENERATIONS. The extent to which the interests of future generations are safeguarded by using positive discount rates is a matter of debate within the literature. With overlapping generations, borrowing and lending can arise as some individuals save for their retirement and others dissave to finance consumption. Models constructed to take this phenomenon into account have shown (Diamond 1965 ) that the discount rate that emerges is not necessarily efficient-that is, it is not the one that takes the economy on the path to maximum long-run welfare. These models, however, lack the component of altruism. Altruism is said to exist when the utility of the current generation is influenced not only by its own consumption but also by the utility of future generations. This is modeled by assuming that the utility of the current generation-generation i-is also influenced by the utility of the second generation j and the third generation k. This approach goes some way toward tackling the question of future generations, but it does so in a rather narrow way. What is being evaluated here is the current generation's judgment about what future generations will think is important. It does not therefore yield a discount rate that reflects some broader principle of the rights of future generations. The essential distinction is between generation i judging what generations j and k want (selfish altruism) and generation i engaging in such use of resources as to leave j and k with the maximum scope for choosing what they want (disinterested altruism) (Page 1977) . And it is not only the extent and nature of the overlap that are important but also the time horizon of the decisionmaker, who may not reflect the preferences of the individuals with respect to future as opposed to present consumption.
Although this form of altruism is recognized as important, its implications for the interest rate and the efficiency of that rate have yet to be worked out.
Some work in this direction is under way and has been referred to by Becker (1988) .
The validity of the overlapping generations argument has also been questioned on the grounds of the roles individuals are playing when they look at future generations' interests. Individuals make decisions in two contexts-private decisions reflecting their own interests and public decisions in which they act with responsibility for fellow beings and for future generations. Market discount rates, it is argued, reflect the private context, whereas social discount rates should reflect the public context. This is what Sen (1982) calls the "dual role" rationale for social discount rates being below the market rates. It resembles the argument that people will behave differently if they can be assured that their own action will be accompanied by similar actions by others. Thus we might each be willing to make transfers to future generations, only if we are individually assured that others will do the same. The "assured" discount rate arising from collective action is lower than the "unassured" rate.
Two other arguments used to justify the idea that market rates will be too high for the interests of future generations are what Sen (1982) calls the "super responsibility" argument and the "isolation paradox" (Sen 1961 (Sen , 1967 . The first contends that, since market discount rates arise from the behavior of individuals, whereas the state is a separate entity with the responsibility for guarding collective welfare and the welfare of future generations, the rate of discount relevant to state investments will not be the same as the private rate and, since high rates discriminate against future generations, we would expect the state discount rate to be lower than the market rate. The second is rather similar to that generated by the assurance problem but arises from slightly different considerations. The argument is that when individuals cannot capture the entire benefits of present investments for their own descendants, the private rate of discount will be below the social rate.
Hence, for a variety of reasons relating to future generations' interests, the social discount rate may be below the market rate. The implications for the choice of the discount rate are that there is a need to look at an individual's public behavior, or to leave the choice of the discount rate to the state, or to try and select a rate based on a collective savings contract. None of these options, however, offers a practical procedure for determining the discount rate in quantitative terms. What they do suggest is that market rates will not be proper guides to social discount rates once future generations' interests are incorporated into the social decision rule. These arguments can be used to reject the use of a market-based rate if it is thought that the burden of accounting for future generations' interests should fall on the discount rate. However, this is a complex and almost certainly untenable procedure. It may be better to retain the conventional criteria for determining the discount rate (that is, the interests of the current generation) and to define and use the rights of future generations to circumscribe the overall evaluation. Such an approach is illustrated shortly.
Discount Rates and Specific Environmental Issues
So far we have looked at the rationale for discounting and the debate on the choice of the discount rate from an environmental perspective. In this section we look at specific environmental issues and see how they are affected by the discounting process. The issues considered are irreversible damage and the management of natural resources.
IRREVERSIBLE DAMAGE. One special environmental consideration that might, prima facie, seem to argue for the adjustment of the discount rate is that of irreversibility. As the term implies, the concern is with decisions whose outcome cannot be reversed, such as the flooding of a valley, the destruction of ancient monuments, the disposal of radioactive waste, and the loss of tropical forests. These considerations have been incorporated in a cost-benefit methodology by Krutilla and Fisher (1975) and generalized by Porter (1982) . We outline the basic ideas below.
Consider a valley containing a unique wilderness area, in which a hydroelectric development is being proposed. The area, once flooded, would be lost forever and these forgone benefits are clearly part of the costs of the project. The net benefits of the whole scheme are the total benefits, less the total costs of the development, less the net benefits of preservation (that is, benefits of preservation less any costs of preservation). All the benefits and costs need to be expressed in present value terms. The irreversible loss of the preservation benefits might suggest that the discount rate should be set very low, since it would have the effect of making the net benefits of preservation relatively large because these extend over an indefinite future. Since the benefits of development extend over only a finite period (say fifty years) the effect of lowering the discount rate is to lower the net benefits of the project. But Krutilla and Fisher do not adjust the discount rate; they treat it conventionally-that is, they set it equal to some measure of the opportunity cost of capital.
Instead of adjusting the discount rate, Krutilla and Fisher note that the value of benefits from a wilderness area will grow over time because the supply of such areas is shrinking, the demand for their amenities is growing with income and population growth, and the demand to have such areas preserved even by those who do not intend to use them is growing (that is, what are referred to as existence values are increasing). The net effect is to raise the "price" of the wilderness at some annual rate of growth (say g percent). If the price is growing at a rate of g percent and a discount rate r percent is applied to it, this is equivalent to holding the price constant and discounting the benefit at a rate (r -g) percent. The adjustment is very similar to lowering the discount rate but has the attraction that the procedure cannot be criticized for distorting resource allocation in the economy by using variable discount rates.
Krutilla and Fisher engage in a similar but reverse adjustment for the benefits of development. They argue that technological change will tend to reduce the benefits from developments such as hydropower because superior electricitygenerating technologies will take their place over time. The basis for this argument is less clear, but, if one accepts it, the benefits of development are subject to technological depreciation. Assume this rate of depreciation is k percent. Then the effect is to produce a net discount rate of (r + k) percent, thereby lowering the discounted value of the benefits of development.
THE MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES. The crucial decision for the management of natural resources is how much to consume now and how much to hold in store for future consumption. It is intuitively clear that this decision will be influenced by the price of present as opposed to future consumptionthat is, by the discount rate. The full analysis of the relation between the discount rate and the pattern of exploitation of natural resources is complex (see Clark 1990) ; the relevant point is that the higher the discount rate, the faster the depletion of an exhaustible resource and the more intense the harvesting of a renewable resource. 3 This means that exhaustible resources will be depleted more quickly and smaller stocks of renewable resources will exist at higher discount rates. Moreover, the combination of high discount rates with high ratios of price to cost for harvesting can lead to "optimal" extinction of the resource (Clark 1990) .
These features of the use of natural resources have several implications for their management. The first is that investments in the resource-exploiting activity need to pay special attention to the effects of discount rates on the time profile of benefits and costs. For example, if there are two projects, one of which exhausts a resource in ten years and another in twenty-five years, then the higher the discount rate, the more likely it is that the former will be chosen over the latter. High discount rates can exist for a number of reasons, such as anti-inflationary monetary policy or capital rationing. They may be fully justified in those contexts but may have undesirable consequences for projects involving natural resources.
The exploitation of natural resources will also be excessive if the private discount rate is higher than the social rate and the control of the resource is in private hands. Methods for correcting this overexploitation have been discussed extensively elsewhere (Pearce forthcoming; Repetto, McGarth, and Wells 1986) . In general, however, these do not involve changing the private rate of discount. The reasons for this rate being too high are pervasive in the whole economy, and the rate itself is not easily manipulated. Resources can be conserved by the appropriate use of resource taxes, which allow the government to capture more of the rent arising from the development of resources. Apart from slowing this development where desirable, resource taxes also have the advantage of mobilizing funds for the government in a particularly efficient way.
For all the reasons discussed, any special lowering of discount rates for natural resource projects is unlikely to be desirable. Furthermore, practical diffi-culties arise if some projects are to be treated as special and others not. There is the question of which projects should qualify. Inevitably there will be gray areas that will cause further problems. Second, many decisions about the exploitation of resources are made privately, and it is not practicable to change discount rates for private individuals in one field of activity alone. Third, even if lower discount rates were used, there is no guarantee that some serious resource degradation might not occur.
Sustainability
The environmental debate has undoubtedly contributed to valuable intellectual soul-searching on the rationale for discounting. But, in our view, it has not made the case for rejecting discounting as such. We began by examining the concern over the use of discount rates that reflect pure time preference, but concluded that this disquiet does not provide grounds for rejecting pure time preference completely. We noted, however, that an abnormally high time preference rate can be generated when incomes are falling and when environmental degradation is taking place. In these circumstances, it is inappropriate to apply discount rates based on these high rates of time preference to policies, particularly environmentally relevant ones.
The arguments by environmentalists against the use of opportunity cost of capital discount rates were also, in general, not found to be persuasive. To account for uncertainty in the appraisal of investments, it is preferable to adjust the cost and benefit streams for the uncertainty rather than to add a risk premium onto the discount rate. Finally, under the general reanalysis of the rationale for discounting, we examined the arguments for adjusting discount rates on various grounds of intergenerational justice. Although many of these arguments have merit, we concluded that adjusting the discount rate to allow for them was not, in general, a practicable or efficient procedure. But the need to protect the interests of future generations remains paramount in the environmental critique of discounting (Feinberg 1980 , Goodin 1986 , and some alternative policy is therefore required if the route of adjusting the discount rate is not to be followed. One possibility is a policy that recognizes the constraints imposed by the need for sustainability.
The notion of sustainability, or sustainable development, is widely discussed in WCED (1987) . Few attempts have been made to analyze the concept rigorously (Pezzey 1989; Pearce, Barbier, and Markandya 1989) , but the basic idea is that economic development requires a strong policy of protecting the natural resource base-in other words, that the resource base should be maintained intact in some sense, or even enhanced. The link between maintaining the overall capital base of the economy (both manmade and "natural" capital) and intergenerational equity is established in some of the recent literature (Solow 1986 ). Advocates of sustainability go further and separate out natural capital for special attention. In the developing world one justification for this would be the close dependence of large parts of the population on natural capital (soil, water, and biomass). More generally, ecological science suggests that much natural capital cannot be substituted for by manmade capital (an example might be the ozone layer). Other rationales are given in Pearce, Barbier, and Markandya (1989) .
If conservation of natural environments is a condition of sustainability, and if sustainability answers many (perhaps all) of the valid criticisms of discounting, how might sustainability be built into the appraisal of projects? Requiring that no project should contribute to environmental deterioration would be absurd. But it is not absurd to require that the portfolio of projects as a whole should not contribute to environmental deterioration. One way to meet the condition of sustainability is to require that any environmental damage be compensated by projects specifically designed to improve the environment. Introducing this additional sustainability constraint on projects has some interesting implications for their design and selection (Pearce, Barbier, and Markandya 1989) . One of these is that the choice of discount rate no longer becomes a key issue as far as the protection of the environment is concerned. It can then function as a mechanism for allocating scarce resources to investment, which has always been its primary role. There are many unanswered questions about how a criterion of sustainability would operate and what its implications would be-and these could be quite radical. In view of its importance, however, it should be a priority to investigate the operational possibilities of the criterion. This would be preferable to attempting to adjust the discount rate to account for the complex environmental concerns that arise in economic development.
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1. The consumption weight could also vary according to the income level of the recipient. Such "distributional" weights are frequently referred to in theory but are rarely used in practice.
2. Similar, but more extreme, is the position of one of the referees to this article, who has argued that calculating present values in which the allocations that accrue to different people are discounted and added up is invalid, because the latter is a distributional issue and cannot be addressed through the use of a discount rate. But taking this argument to its logical conclusion would also imply that we could not add up benefits or costs across individuals even at a point in time, which is a familiar distributional difficulty in cost-benefit analysis but one that can be and has been surmounted in various ways.
3. In fact, the relation between discount rates and the optimal extraction path can be quite unintuitive and even perverse. As Chapman (1986) and Rowse (1988) have shown, paths that are very close to being optimal can be unexpectedly divergent, and their distributional implications could be very different. Thus it could be difficult to choose between paths on the grounds of optimality alone in the presence of discounting, and it may be necessary to invoke other considerations, such as equity.
